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IN THE S·UPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ARCHIE POULSEN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 76'63

C. V. niANNESS, doing business as
Manness Construction & Appliance
Company, and UDELL WOOD,

Defendants and .Appellmnts.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

The record was prepared with the transcript of
testimony beginning on page 16. References to the transscript are designated "Tr." References to the record
other than the transcript are designated ''R. ''
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, hereinafter called plaintiff, brought
this action against the appellants, C. V. Manness,
doing business as Manness Construction & Appliance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Company, and Udell Woods, hereinafter referred to
as defendants, for damages and injuries resulting from
an intersection collision between the jeep plaintiff was
driving and the automobile driven by the defendant,
Udell Wood, while said Wood was in the employ of the
defendant, Manness. The case was tried before a jury.
After the opening statement by counsel for the plaintiff, defendant moved the court for a directed verdict
based upon counsel's opening ~tatement and the answers to written interrogatories of the plaintiff on file
and of record. The court denied this motion. After
the close of plaintiff's case, the trial court denied defendants' motion for a nonsuit, and after both parties
had introduced their evidence and rested, the trial
court denied defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and against
the defendants. Thereafter, the trial court denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and defendants' motion for a new trial. It is
from this verdict, the judgment which was entered, and
the trial court's rulings that defendants appeal.
Mr. Archie Poulsen, the plaintiff, was a farmer,
mechanic and heavy machine operator, 46 years of
age, living in Sugarville, Utah. On August 4, 1949, he
had gone to the neighboring town of Delta to get some
repairs for machinery he had been working on. (Tr.
12-13) He left Delta at 11:00 or 11:15 o'clock A.M.,
driving his jeep and accompanied by his wife, Norma
Poulsen, who was sitting on the right in the front seat,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and his sn1all son, J a1nes, sitting 1n the middle of the
front seat between then1. The jeep was painted green
and had a brown top. (Tr. 63) He drove northwest
of Delta about half a mile and then on the Abraham
road to the Sugarville-Hinckley road and north on
that road to its intersection with the Topaz highway,
at which intersection the accident occurred. (Tr. 14)
The Sugarville-Hinckley road is a graveled surface
road, running north and south, and is approximately
24 feet wide. The Topaz highway is a hard surfaced
or oiled road running east and west, the oiled surface
being 20 feet wide with a 2 foot graveled shoulder on
each side thereof. (Tr. 21-22) At the time of the ac~
cident there was a wooden bridge on the SugarvilleHinckley road just south of the intersection in question and sunflowers and weeds ·6 to 7¥2 feet tall grew
on the shoulders of the highway. (Tr. 15, 62, 125, 152,
153)
The defendant, Udell Wood, left Delta the same
morning driving an automobile owned by the defendant,
Manness. He was accompanied by one Bud Barker, and
they were going to Abraham, located on the Topaz
highway about ¥2 mile west of the scene of the accident.
(Tr. 158) Wood turned west onto the Topaz highway,
and proceeded about 100 feet before the road became
rough, quite badly marked and badly cut up, which
condition existed until some 1,500 feet to nearly %
mile east of the intersection in question, (Tr. 67, 129,
158-9) over which portion of the road Wood drove at
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a speed of about 10 miles per hour. From where this
bad part of the road ends to the intersection the road
is straight, bordered by sunflowers and weeds, and
Wood accelerated until he reached a speed he testified
as being 50 miles per hour (Tr. 159, 193) and which
the plaintiff estimated to be around 70 miles per hour.
(Tr. 16-18) The defendant, Wood, did not see plaintiff's jeep until he was just about 40 feet from it (Tr.
160) at which time he put on his brakes and left skid
marks on the oiled surface from 22 to 30 feet long to
the point of impact. (Tr. 124, 129-30, 175)
When Mr. Poulsen approached the intersection
from the south, he brought his jeep to a stop with the
front wheels 3 feet back from the south line of the
Topaz highway. He then looked to the east and the
west, put his jeep in gear and started forward until
he could see farther west, and when he was about in
the center of the Topaz road, he turned and looked
east and saw the defendants' automobile about 30 or
40 feet away from him. (Tr. 15, 22) Mr. Poulsen had
reached the speed of about 10 miles per hour when the
collision occurred. The front of the defendants' automobile struck the front center of the jeep at a point
in the intersection which could be designated as just
slightly north of the center of the intersection. After
the accident, the jeep came to rest on its side heading
north from 35 to 45 feet northwest of the point of the
impact, and the automobile of defendant came to rest
he'ading east from 25 to 30 feet west of the point of
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impact. ~lr. and ~Irs. Poulsen were on the ground and
in or by a ditch just west and north of the jeep. ( T r.
18, 19, 51, 113, 123-4, 164)
ST~-\.TE:JIENT

OF POINTS

1. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
THE SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUE OF THE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS.

2. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE
PLAINTIFF, ARCHIE POULSEN, WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANTS' FIRST MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NON-SUIT.
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
6. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
7. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE
SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUE OF
NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS

Mr. Wood had only been on the Topaz highway
once before. Shortly after he turned onto the highway, he encountered a badly cut up surface and drove
at a speed of about 10 miles per hour until he was some
1,500 feet from the intersection where the accident ocSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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curred. The highway was lined with a thick growth
of sunflowers and weeds some 7-¥2 feet tall, and there
was nothing to indicate the existance of the intersection in question as he approached it. Any observation to the south and west of the highway would fail
to disclose plaintiff's jeep approaching for an embankment and weeds were along the east side of the Sugarville-Hinckley road traveled by the plaintiff. The
highway was straight and flat and had an oiled macadam surface indicative of a highway and not a side
road. It was not unusual or peculiar that the defendant, Wood, failed to see the plaintiff's jeep until it
was in the middle of the intersection, for the jeep was
green, like the weeds, and had proceeded some 13 feet
to the center of the intersection from a hidden position
in a maximum time of some 2 seconds as will be hereinafter illustrated. Defendant, Wood, testified that he
looked at his speedometer and then back at the road
and then saw the jeep for the first time. There can
be no negligence imputed to defendant, Wood, for his
failure to avoid plaintiff's jeep after seeing it in the
middle of the road for any application of the last clear
chance doctrine would have to be predicated upon the
ability of defendant, Wood, to avoid the collision after
he saw plaintiff's jeep, and the record entirely negatives such a possibility. H'ickok v. Skinner, ____ Utah ____ ,
190 P. 2d 514; Gren v. Norton, ____ Utah ____ , 213 P. 2d 356.
Nor is there any evidence of the f•ailure of the defendants
to have the automobile under proper control. In fact, the
application of brakes and resulting skid marks are the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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only affirn1ati.ve evidence that he did have the car under
innnediate and proper control. Nor is there any evidence of failure by defendant to yield the right of way,
for defendant was approaching from the plaintiff's
right, and even though plaintiff entered the intersection first, the right of way did not become his when defendant was so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard. Gren v. Norton, supra.; Hickok v. Skinner,
supra.; Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350. In
the Gren v. Norton case, supra, at page 358, this court
re-affirmed the following rule :
''The rule we announced was that while
plaintiff had the right-of-way over defendant
when he started into the intersection he was
not permitted, after observing defendant's approaching automobile, to ignore it completely
thereafter. ''
The only alleged negligence on the part of defendant, Wood, was a purported 70 mile per hour speed.
It is submitted that the only affirmative evidence in
the case is that defendant, Wood, had reached a speed
of 50 miles per hour just before the accident, as he
testified:

'' Q. As I understand your testimony there
is some bad spot in the road.
''A. Well, it is very rough.

''Q. Very rough?
''A.

No surface.

'' Q. Do I understand that is 1500 feet 7
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''A.

Up to 1500 feet before the accident.

"Q. I see. Now, would you please tell the
court and jury what the condition of the road
was after you left this rough spot~
''A. Yes sir. It was a hard surface road,
slightly pocked, not anything to be rough or
hinder driving.

'' Q. Were there sunflowers or weeds along
the

side~

''A. A great deal of them, very thick and
very tall.

"Q. At what speed were you traveling
along that road after you left the rough part?'
"A. After-as soon as I left the rough
spot I was traveling at the rate of ten miles an
hour. I accelerated the motor and picked up the
speed to fifty before the :accident.

'' Q.

You were up to fifty before the ac-

cident~

the

"A.

Yes sir.

'' Q.

When did you fiirst see the jeep of

plaintiff~

"A.

I did just before I hit it.

"Q. Just before you hit
''A.

it~

Yes.

'' Q. Now, when you say just before, do
you have any idea about how far away it was¥
"A.

I should say approximately forty feet.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
'' Q. Around forty feet'
"A.

Yes sir.

'' Q. And how fast were you going at the
time you saw the jeep~

''A.

Fifty miles an hour.

'' Q. Why do you say fifty miles an
Do you knowt

hour~

''A. I do know, because I looked down at
the speedometer and glanced right up and the
minute I glanced up, there was the jeep and
immediately applied my brakes as fast as
thought would allow me and slid my brakes
into the jeep.
on~

'' Q.

You did put your brakes

"A.

Yes sir.

"Q.

Did all four tires catch hold, if you

know~

''A. I do know they did, sir.
'' Q.

Did you turn to the right or the left?

"A.

No sir.

''Q.

Why not?

''A. I had no thought of turning, just to
stop. The only spot I could see was directly in
front of me. I seen no intersection to turn on.''
(Tr. 158-160)
Here is no guess or estimate in just a flash. Examine the testimony of the plaintiff in that regard:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'' Q. About how fast was the Oldsmobile
being driven¥ If you know¥

"MR. AADNESEN: Just a minute, I object to that, there is nothing here to indicate
he knew.
''THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

"Q. Did you have occasion to observe the
speed of the Oldsmobile as it came toward you
on the highway¥
''A. No, I wouldn't have any way of knowing how fast he was coming, only he was coming
awful fast.
''MR. AADNESEN: I object to that last
portion as a conclusion of this witness.
"THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

"Q. Have you driven automobiles for very
long, Mr. Poulsen 1
''A. Oh, I have driven automobiles I guess
for around-! am forty-six, and I started driving
when I was sixteen. I guess I have driven automobiles for thirty years.
'' Q. Are you accustomed to observing the
speed of automobiles¥

''A.

Other than my own, you mean¥

"Q. Would you have any idea of the speed
of an automobile if you were to observe it moving
on the highway 1
''A. Well, possibly would if the automobile
was traveling sideways from me. When one is
coming directly towards you it is hard to estiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mate the exact speed, the only thing you could
tell would be the approximate speed.

"Q. Could you tell me the approximate
speed of this car, Mr. Poulsen~
'' ~IR. AAD~ESEN: He said he didn't observe it only for a split second; there is nothing here to qualify this witness. May I refer
to the record where he stated he couldn't tell~
''MR. ELIASON: I asked the speed
of the car.
"MR. AADNESEN: Let's have the record
read.
(Part of record read.)
''THE COURT:
no to the question.
"A.

How is

He may answer yes or

that~

"THE COURT: You may answer yes or
no to that.
(Last question read)
"A.
speed.
''Q.

Yes, I could tell you the approximate
What was the 'approximate

speed~

"MR. AADNESEN: I object to it on the
same basis, your Honor, the record specifically
shows he has no knowledge of what it is, based
on speculation.
''MR. ELIASON: Based on observation.
''THE COURT: He may answer.
''MR. AADNESEN: There is another question back thereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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''THE COURT: The way the court remembers it, where he asked with reference to speed,
he says he couldn't observe it long enough.
"MR. AADNESEN: That is perfectly all
right, at least the record is clear.
"Q. Would

you

state

the approximate

speed~

"THE COURT: Just a moment.
"MR. ELIASON: I didn't know that there
was an objection.
''THE COURT: Read the other question
he gave a few minutes ago.
(Part of record read as follows: 'Q.
Did you have occasion to observe the speed of
the Oldsmobile as it came toward you on the
highway~')

"THE COURT: He may answer the pending question. Do you remember the question~
''A.

How is

that~

"THE COURT:

Do you remember the

question~

''A. The last question he asked me, how fast.
I would say"MR. AADNESEN: Just a moment.
(Last question read)
"A. I would say that he was making
seventy miles an hour or better." (Tr. 16-18)
It is apparent from this testimony that Mr. Poulsen's estimate of speed was a mere speculation or
guess and constituted no affirmative evidence. The
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only other instance where 70 miles per hour is even
mentioned is in the recital of the purported conversation with defendant, \Yood. The attention of this
court is respectfully called to the fact that three other
witnesses indulged in or heard the purported conversation, and yet only one witness is supposed to
have heard an admission that defendant, Wood, was
going 70 miles per hour. The importance of this is
well indicated by the cross-examination in that particular:

"Q. You have been sitting here while the
other young gentlemen testified, Mr. Gardner
and :\lr. Poulsen '
"A.

Yes sir.

"Q. You alone apparently recall something
about speed.
''A.

That is right.

'' Q.

Do you have any reason for

that~

''A. Because at the time of the accident
I heard about it and I was wondering how
come---:how fast he would have to go to knock
a jeep just as far as he did.
'' Q. Just a moment, I asked you a question about a conversation.

''A.

I understood.

'' Q. My question goes to why did you
hear it and the others not.

''A.

I don't know that they didn't.
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"Q. You don't know that they didn't.
They didn't so testify, you have sat here,
haven't you~
"A.

Yes sir."
•

•

:11:

'' Q. Now, you heard these other boys testify. Wasn't their testimony as you heard it
that they were standing and not sitting in the carY
"A. Mr. Wood and Mr. Gardner was standing outside the car. Donald Poulsen and Clara
Jeffrey and myself was sitting in the car.
"Q.

Where was Mr. Poulsen?

"A. He was setting [sic] on the side opposite from the driver's side.

'' Q. Opposite from the driver. Where was
Mr. Wood standing~
''A. He was standing at the door next to
where Don was sitting.
"Q.

Where were you sitting?

''A.

I was under the driver's seat.

'' Q. And so you were clear over under
the driver's seat~
"A.

That is right." (Tr. 104-105)

The apparent value of this testimony can be
ascertained from the remarks of the trial court to
the effect that defendant was driving approximately
50 miles per hour. (Tr. 193) It is further noted
that no evidence appears in the record as to any
speed limit on the Topaz highway nor was any such
presented to the jury. To predicate the negligence of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the defendant on such a slim possibility when the only
affinnatiYe evidence i~ otherwise is to allow the jury to
indulge in vagaries and speculations.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PLAINTIFF,
ARCHIE POULSEN, WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW

Just before the accident, the plaintiff drove his
green jeep north on the Sugarville-Hinckley road. As
he approached the intersection where the accident occurred, his vie\\T to the northeast ·was obstructed by a
rather high embankment of soil piled by the east
side of the road, apparently placed there as a result
of an excavation for a drainage ditch. A dense
growth of sunflowers and weeds lined the sides of
this road and the Topaz highway and grew to a
heighth of some 7lf2 feet. There was no stop sign
on the south side of the Topaz highway at the intersection controlling plaintiff's travel across the Topaz
highway, although there had been one there previously.
Plaintiff stopped his jeep before entering the intersection because he was fully aware of the dangers
attendant thereto and he testified to them as follows:
'' Q. As you approached this intersection
of th~" Topaz road tell the court and the jury
what, if anything, you did.

''A. Well, we drove up to the road and
stopped, I would estimate, about three feet
from the oil.
'' Q.

Just a moment.

Why did you stop

there~
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''A. Well, there was quite a lot of weeds
on the road, my vision wasn't too clear. I knew
they were hauling ore from out at the mine,
those trucks go through there quite fast. I
was quite cautious as I go across the road.
I pulled up and stopped and looked east as
far as I could, I would say some 400 feet, and
I looked to the west, I couldn't see so far. I
put the jeep in gear and started westward
until I could see west. I could see west and
there was no traffic from the west, and I turned
and looked over the other way and I saw this
Oldsmobile right on top of me.
'' Q.

How far from

you~

''A. Forty or fifty feet, and of course in
just a second there was a crash.

"Q. Just a moment, Mr. Poulsen. Where
were you in relation to this Topaz road at the
time that you first saw this Oldsmobile?
''A. I would say I was about in the center
of the road when I first saw it.

"Q. Then it was just before you reached
the center of the road that you looked west.
''A.

Yes, that is right.

'' Q.

Then you looked again east,

IS

that

right~

"A.

That is right.

"Q. What portion of the road was this
Oldsmobile traveling on Y
''A. He was on his side of the road, righthand side, north side." (Tr. 15-16)

* *

*
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· 'Q. C shows a picture of the road upon
which you came t
''A.

Yes sir.

"Q.

Prior to entering the intersection.

''A.

Yes.

'' Q. If you look in the background you
see some dirt piled there, a drainage ditch.

''A.

Yes.

''Q.

Creates quite a high embankment.

''A. I would say about four foot bank,
four and a half.
''Q.

Four and a half foot bank.

''A.

That is right.

'' Q. Could you see the car or automobile
of this defendant coming along the Topaz highway from a point farther!

''A.

This bank!

''Q.

Yes.

''A. Yes, because there isn't a solid bank,
his machine cut along and dumped the piles
over the bank here, at the bottom between the
piles, one was four feet high, so you can see
through the bank some parts along there.
'' Q.

Did you look through the

bank~

''A. No, the bank was way back from
the road, no occasion for me to look through
the bank.
''MR. ELIASON: How far back is this
bank from the Topaz road!
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''A. 185 feet, the road back to the startIng point of the bank.
'' Q. Between the bank and the main road
there were weeds~
''A. You can see the weeds.
'' Q.

The sunflowers then were cut

out~

''A. A few, he has made one swath around,
the large weeds are still growing.
"Q. Now, in Exhibit E, this bank and
cut we are talking about is still there.
"A.

Yes sir.

"Q.

That is the one we are talking about.

''A.

Yes.

'' Q. Out from the Topaz road looking
south and west you see the embankment.
''A.

Yes.

''Q.

You see the fence with weeds along

there~

''A. Yes.
''Q.

Here is the ditch.

''A. Yes.
"Q. Then, is that the ditch that runs
under the bridge the road went over~
''A.

Yes.

'' Q. These weeds, they have been cut down
on the side~
"A.

Yes." (Tr. 48-49)

* •

*
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••Q. The highest parts of the weeds would
they be approximately how high~
"A.

Approximately six feet.

"'Q.

Quite dense, weren't

'' . .\.

I don't remember that.

· · Q.

Do you know how tall your jeep wast

they~

• · 4\. :My jeep would be, I would say, about
five and a half feet to the top.
feet~

"Q.

Five and a half

''A.

Five and a half feet.

"Q. You were sitting
"A.

down~

Yes." (Tr. 62)

* * *
'' Q.

There were weeds on the

''A.

Yes.

corner~

'' Q. You were against those weeds looking
to the east and to the west down the topaz
highway, and your jeep was against the weeds
for a considerable time then as you proceeded~

''A.

Yes.

"Q.

Both the same color.

''A. The top of the jeep isn't green, the
top was brown." (Tr. 63)

* * *
'' Q. I understand you to say you knew
that there had been some ore hauling, or ore
trucks going on that road'

''A.

That is right.
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'' Q. That is both to the east and the west,
isn't it¥

''A. That is right, loaded ones going east.
'' Q. The unloade9. ones going west 1
"A.

That is right." (Tr. 65)

* * *
'' Q. Had you been over the Topaz road
yourself in the period of time shortly before
the accident, say a week or so~
"A. Had I been over it~ Yes, I have been
out that way quite a lot of times.

"Q. You are acquainted with the road
quite welU
"A.

Yes." (Tr. 66-67)

Mr. 0. J. Bennett, Deputy Sheriff of Millard County,
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and
testified as follows:
'' Q. Which roadways were those weeds and
sunflowers in~

''A. Oh, they were on the Topaz road, also
on the Sugarville road, Sugarville-Deseret, or
whatever they call it.

'' Q. Would you have any idea as to about
the height of those weeds 1 Of course they
would vary.
''A. I think I measured one out there from
the root to the top; I think it was seven and a
half feet.'' ( Tr. 125)
It is noted that in spite of all of this recognition
of the danger, plaintiff did not see defendants' car
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wa~

in the center of the Topaz highway and
defendant~' car wa8 40 or 50 feet from him and on
the right-hand side of the highway where be belonged.
As further evidence of these conditions, we refer the
court to Exhibits "A", "C", "E", "F", and "G".
Further testimony of the plaintiff illustrates the
position he found himself in when he stopped at the
intersection :

"Q. ~lr. Poulsen, just one or two more
questions. Thly recollection of your testimony
now, to reflect a little, you said the front wheels
of your jeep were back about two or three feet
from the oiled portion of the highway.
''A.

That is right.

"Q. And in that position you could see
something like 400 feet to the east.
''A.

That is right.

"Q. Now, do you have any idea how far
back from the front wheels you were sitting~
''A. Well, the jeep is pretty short. I would
say 'about three feet, three and a half.
'' Q. That would put you approximately
six feet then back from the oiled portion~

"A.

About that, yes.

'' Q. Now, your testimony has been, hasn't
it, that the shoulder of the Topaz road was
two, two and a half feet-

'' A.

About two and a half feet, yes.

'' Q. And the sunflowers grew right on that
shoulder, didn't they~
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''A. Well now, there was about two and
a half feet, they grew up to this shoulder.
"Q. Grew up to the shoulder, about two
and a half feet from the edge of the shoulder.
"A.

That's right, two and a half feet.

'' Q. So you were some-let's say, two or
two and a half feet, and you were six feet back
so you were some three to four feet back, three
and a half to four feet back from the edge of
the sunflowers, weren't you 7

''A. That's right.
'' Q. And yet you could see 400 feet up
the road.

''A.

That is right.

'' Q. I hand you Exhibit B, you identify,
do you not, the shoulder of the road, about two
feet~

"A.

That is right.

'' Q.

And the weeds grew right to that

shoulder~

''A. Yes.
"Q. So that you were stopped with the
front of your wheels behind that shoulder of the
road, the shoulder line.

"A.

That is right.

'' Q. And you were three and a half to
four feet back of that yourself~

''A.

That's right.

'' Q. Just so we understand it. And you
could see 400 feet to the east.
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··A.

That is right.

•'Q. Now, you never at any time, did you,
look to the east again until just a fraction of
a second before the in1pact ~
"A.

That's right.

'' Q. And that in spite of the fact that you
knew that heavy ore trucks were passing on
that road.
"A.

That's right. They were.

'' Q. When they were going west on that
road are you acquainted with whether they
were filled or unfilled 1
"A. I am acquainted with they were unfilled, they were empty trucks going west.

'' Q. It is a little down hill1
"A.

It is perfectly flat.

"Q. Perfectly flat. And so you traveled
from a position some approximately six feet
back from the edge of the highway to a position out to the center of the intersection without
ever again looking again to the east.
"A.

That's right.

'' Q. And as a matter of fact, when you
did look to the east there was nothing you could
do to avoid the accident.
''A. He was too close to me then, coming
too fast." (Tr. 68-70)
These facts permit only the following conclusions:
First, plaintiff was fully aware of all of the
dangers and conditions at the intersection.
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Second, when plaintiff stopped, he stopped too far
back to properly observe west bound traffic on the
Topaz highway; or, if he was far enough forward to
observe the west bound traffic, he failed to see defendants' car when it was openly visible and obvious.
Third, he failed to look to the east until he was
1n the middle of the Topaz highway, when it was
too late to avoid the accident.
Cons1dering these conclusions separately, it is apparent that plaintiff failed to exercise that degree of
care required of hin1 under the circumstances and
established beyond any possibility of a question m
reasonable minds that he was guilty of negligence as
a matter of law.
First, his testimony leaves no grounds for contrary argument or discussion that the dangers noted
in the intersection existed and were recognized by
him. He had traveled this road many times before,
and was well acquainted with all the circumstances
and physical factors.
Second, plaintiff stopped his jeep before entering
the intersection. The stark, unadorned facts compelled him to stop, for he drove a green jeep with a
brown top which blended with the sunflowers and
weeds. He knew the ore trucks were traveling the
Topaz highway, and he knew these trucks or anyone
traveling the highway would have difficulty seeing
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him in his jeep against the weeds and sunflowers. He
knew he had been hidden from observation by west
bound traffic as he approached the intersection because of the bank of soil on the east side of the rO'ad.
From these circumstances and his testimony, it is
obvious that he did not expect traffic on the Topaz
highway to know he was approaching or going to
cross, and he knew or should have known that west
bound traffic had the right-of-way. And so Mr. Poulsen stopped, but he stopped with his front wheels
some 3 feet south of the Topaz highway! There is
no conflict in the evidence that the sunflowers and
weeds grew densely to within about 2 feet of the
Topaz highway. Nor is there any conflict that this
placed ~Ir. Poulsen some 6 feet back from the highway
as he sat in his jeep, and he so testified. No other
conclusion can be placed upon such facts nor inference
drawn than the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Poulsen's view of the Topaz highway to the east was
obstructed by a 4 foot thicket of sunflowers and weeds
some 7lf2 feet tall ! And, as he testified, he couldn't
even see as well to the west. Plaintiff attempted to.
counteract the devastating impact of his own testimony regarding the physical facts by a purported
measurement made subsequent to the accident and
after the weeds had been cut down. He stated that£
from where he stopped he could see some 400 feet
to the east on the Topaz highway. We submit that
this is contradictory to his own previous testimony,
and appears to be a physical impossibility. But even
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so, this only serves as additional evidence of his
negligence for at the same time he estimates his speed
at the time of the impact to have been 10 miles per
hour. (Tr. 60, R. 12) He is aware of the fact that
according to his instant glance estimate of the speed
of defendants' automobile, defendant would have been
covering about 102 feet per second. (Tr. 58) It is
respectfully submitted to this court that plaintiff went
from a stopped position of zero miles per hour to 10
miles per hour at point of impact, or an average speed of
5 miles per hour representing a speed of 7.33 feet
per second. The Topaz highway was 20 feet wide on
the oiled surface, but plaintiff traveled the 3 feet to
the oiled surface plus the 10 feet half way across, or
a total of approximately 13 feet, before the impact.
To travel the distance of 13 feet at 7.33 feet per
second would take a fraction of a second less than
2 seconds. Even discounting the fact that defendant,
Wood, applied his brakes and thus decelerated his
automobile prior to the crash, and admitting for the
sake of argument only that defendant, Wood, was
driving as fast as plaintiff claims, defendants' automobile could have been only 204 feet east of the intersection when plaintiff began his negligent crossing of
the highway. If plaintiff could see 400 feet east on
the road, a.s he says he could, he certainly failed to
see what was there to be s·een.
This court has clearly established the law governing such circumstances and held the plaintiff guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
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Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350; Hickok v.
Skinner, ------Utah ______ , 190 P. 2d 514; Conklin v. Walsh,
------ Utah ______ , 193 P. 2d 437; Gren v. Norton, ______ Utah
______ , 213 P. 2d 356 ; 136 A.L.R. 1497.
In the Bullock v. Luke case, supra ,this court said :
''The question may arise: When should
Bullock have seen Luke to have avoided the
characterization of being negligent~ In Blashfield, Vol. 2, Permanent Edition, Cyclopedia of
Automobile Law and Practice, page 230, § 1038,
this statement is found:
'There is no arbitrary rule as to the
time and place of looking for vehicles on an
intersecting road, and no particular distance
from the intersection is prescribed for that
purpose. The general standards are that
observation should be made at the first
opportunity and at a point where observation will be reasonably efficient for, and
conduce to, protection. '
"We do not have to determine any given
point. It is sufficient if under all the circumstances we can properly say that Bullock's
failure to see Luke was, as a matter of law,
negligence. ' '
As shown by plaintiff's testimony, plaintiff stopped
his jeep at a point 4 feet back of the forward edge
of the dense thicket of weeds taller than his jeep, and
·certainly at a point where observation was not reasonably efficient for, or conducive to, protection.
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In the Hickok v. Skinner case, supra, this court
also established the following rule of law:
''While the facts in the case of Bullock v.
Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350, are dissimilar,
one of the rules laid- down by that case is applicable here; and that is, regardless of which driver
is technically entitled to the right of way, both
operators must use due care and caution in proceeding into and across intersections. While the
burden to drive so carefully as always to be
prepared for, and to be able to ·avoid, the
negligence of another should not be placed on
either driver, there should be placed on both
the burden to keep a proper lookout and to use
reasonable care to avoid a collision. Neither
should be permitted to close his eyes to other
vehicles which he knows or has reason to believe
are approaching, simply because a state statute
or municipal ordinance designates him the preferred driver. The rights of drivers approaching
and crossing intersections are relative. Both
drivers have the duties of being heedful and
of maintaining a pr-oper lookout. Plaintiff was
neglectful in both particulars, and no jury could
reasonably find that he was not negligent.
"Plaintiff in claiming that, having looked
once and having concluded that he had time to
clear the intersection, he was not negligent in
not having looked again, overlooks two factors
that we believe are of controlling influence in
this case, and which affect the application of the
rule of the Bullock case mentioned above. The
first is, he was uninformed as to the speed of
defendant's car. The second is that the speed
at which plaintiff was travelling and the distance
he had to travel, before he entered defendant's
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path of travel, pern1itted him time to look and to
reappraise the relative positions of the cars and
pennitted him ample opportunity to correct his
first conclusion, if he had erroneously estimated
the distance the defendant's car was from the
intersection.''
In the instant case, had plaintiff stopped at a
point where observation was possible, he would have
seen defendants' automobile. Also, he was stopped,
thus giving him ample time to appraise the relative
positions of the cars and to have remained where he
was, and thus avoided the accident.
In the Gren v. Norton case, supra, this court reiterated the rule that:
"As we held in the Hickok v. Skinner case,
supra, the fact that the statute gives a motorist
a right-of-way into an intersection does not
permit him to proceed across without observing
the movement of other vehicles which may be
moving into and across the intersection.
*

* *

''In this particular instance deceased was
traveling at a slow rate of speed, should have
seen the truck approaching, and .could have
stopped his car in a very short distance. He
should not be charged with avoiding defendant's
negligence but he is required to maintain a reasonable lookout for his own safety.''
That plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
by his failure to observe what must have been there
to be seen within the 400 feet east on the highway is
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well established by this court 1n the cases of Mingus
v. Olsson, ------ Utah ...... , 201 P. 2d 495, and Sant v.
Miller, ------ Utah ______ , 206 P. 2d 719.
In the Mingus case this court designated the law
applicable to a situation where one fails to see and
pay heed to what must be present to be seen:
''More convincing than the direct testimony
th!lt deceased did not look, is the further evidence that deceased neither said nor did anything
to indicate that he was at all aware of the
danger presented by defendant's approaching
automobile. He seems to have been wholly unaware of its approach. Certainly he did nothing
either to warn his wife, nor to rescue either
himself or her from their position of peril. On
this evidence, it must be said as a matter of
law that deceased either failed to look, or having
looked, failed to see what he should have seen.
"There can be no doubt that a pedestrian
who undertakes to cross a busy street of a
large city, without first observing for vehicular
traffic is guilty of contributory negligence. And
this is true, even though he may be crossing
in a crosswalk, and have the right of way. In
the recent case of Hickok v. Skinner, Utah, 190
P. 2d 514, this court held that a motorist who
had the right of way across an intersection,
nevertheless had a duty to observe for traffic
as he proceeded across the intersection. The
rights of pedestrians to the use of the public
streets are the same as those of motoristsneither greater nor less. Hence, the same general duties devolve upon them. A pedestrian
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trian lane, although he may have the right of
way over Yehicular traffic, nonetheless has the
duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly decedent neglected that duty in this case. It follows
that he was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law. Of course we do not mean to imply that
a mere glance in the direction of the approaching automobile would suffice. The duty to look
has inherent in it the duty to see what is there
to be seen, and to pay heed to it."
In the Sant case this rule is reaffirmed:

''A greater degree of care is necessary upon
the part of a pedestrian who undertakes to cross
a city street at a prohibited place than is placed
on one who uses a marked crosswalk. And
especially is this true, when because of darkness
and climatic conditions, the opportunity for
drivers to clearly discern the pre.sence of individuals on the roadway is greatly restricted. It
is not due care for a person to observ~ what
might be approaching danger when there is no
necessity to look elsewhere.''
As hereinbefore stated, under the facts of the
instant case, if plaintiff could in fact see some 400 feet
to the east as he was stopped before entering the
intersection, his failure to see defendants' ,automobile
which must have been there to be seen, and to pay
heed to it, constituted contributory negligence on his
part so fundamental as to preclude any differing between reasonable minds. We have pointed out before
that plaintiff was well aware of the dangers of the
intersection because of the weeds, and a greater degree
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of care rested upon him. He had no necessity to look
elsewhere, and he should have observed what was an
approaching danger.
In Blashfield, Vol. 2, Permanent Edition, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, pages 237, 241,
§ 1041, the law applicable to the instant case is given:
"Where the view of an intersecting road
by a motorist approaching it is obscured, he
must use special caution in making such approach.

* * *
''The duty of keeping a vigilant out look
in order to fulfill the obligation of the exercise
of ordinary care, is especially applicable in a
case involving an approach to an intersection
along a road or street from which a view of the
intersecting way is obstructed, and most emphatically so where an automobile driver, approaching a street intersection likely to be crossed at
any time by other machines, is thoroughly acquainted with the traffic conditions at that
crossing, and knows of an obstruction on the
cross street preventing drivers from seeing
approaching automobiles on the street whereon
he is travelling.''
The case of Delsman v. Bertotti, 93 P. 2d 371
(Wash. 1939), is directly in point with the instant case.
In that case, plaintiff was well aware of the dangerous
condition of an intersection caused by a hedge which
obscured his view, and although there was no stop
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erly observe defendant's truek, which was approaching
from his right at an excessive rate of speed. In affirming the judgment dismissing the action with prejudice,
the Supreme Court of 'Vashington said:
''The trial court did not err in ruling that
as matter of law appellant was guilty of contributory negligence which barred his recovery in
this action. The northeast corner of the intersection was obstructed. Under the law, appellant
was required to look out for and yield the right
of way to, a vehicle approaching from his right.
The observation which a driver in appellant's
position is required to make is observation from
a point at which he can see, and decide when
he can proceed within a reasonable margin of
safety, not from a point, back from the intersecting street, from which his view is seriously
obstructed. Appellant, at a point approximately
twelve feet east of the east curb line of Fifteenth
avenue, undertook to start his car from a dead
stop and proceed across that highway, without
looking north along that street from the east
curb line on Fifteenth avenue, from which point
he would have had a clear view of approaching
traffic, and would, of course, have seen respondent's truck approaching from his right.
''Appellant argues that under the rule laid
down in the case of Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157
Wash. 563, 289 P. 533, he was deceived by the
fact that the truck was moving at an excessive
rate of speed. Appellant relies upon the Hadenfelt case, contending that the facts in the two
cases are practically identical. In the case cited,
the opinion calls attention to the fact that the
disfavored driver looked to his right from the
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curb line of the intersecting street, and saw
approaching the car with which he subsequently
collided. Under the peculiar circumstances of
the case, this court held that whether or not the
disfavored driver had acted in a reasonably
prudent manner, in consideration of all the
evidence, was for the jury to determine. The
question to be determined involved .a car which
the disfavored driver saw, not a car which he
did not see, and the disfavored driver looked
to his right from a point from which he could
:see all approaching traffic. The last of the four
elements of the rule laid down in the Hadenfeldt
case does not .apply here, as appellant testified
that he did not see respondent's truck until it
was too late for him to stop to avoid the collision, and that if he had seen the truck from the
east margin of Fifteenth avenue, as he must
have seen it, had he looked, he would not have
attempted to cross the intersection ahead of it.''

* * *
''The burden to avoid colliding with a car
approaching from his right rests heavily upon
the disfavored driver. A clear and unambiguous
statute imposes this burden, and the ingrafting
of exceptions upon this sound and wholesome
rule of the road would tend only to confusion,
.and lead drivers occupying the disfavored position under the statute to think that they might
somehow escape the burden imposed upon them
by law, and throw the blame for avoidable accidents upon another. Speed is of much less importance than safety, and under modern traffic
conditions, safety, to a great extent, depends
upon careful and prudent observation both of
natural physical conditions and of other vehiclea
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
using the highway, as well as of pedestrians.
'Ve are in accord with the rules laid down in
the Hadenfeldt case, but are not inclined to
extend the exception therein provided for.
"In the case at bar, appellant relied upon
a somewhat restricted view of Fifteenth avenue to his right. A perfectly clear and unobstructed view ·was available to him after his
car advanced only a few feet from where he
took the observation upon which he relied. In
failing to again look to his right, he was negligent. He did not bear the burden which rested
upon him as the disfavored driver, and the
trial court properly so held."
This case was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
of Washington in the case of Hefner v. Pattee, 96 P.
2d 583 ('Vash. 1939). And the court said:
''In the recent case of Delsman v. Bertotti,
Wash., 93 P. 2d 371, 375, we affirmed a judgment of the superior court dismissing an action
for damages resulting from an intersection collision, calling attention to the fact that the disfavored driver undertook to cross .an intersecting
street without looking to his right from the
curb line, from which point he would have had
a clear view of approaching traffic, and would
necessarily have seen the approaching vehicle,
which had the right of way. Neither street was
an arterial, but in view of the facts, that is
not an important difference. In the course of
the opinion, we used the following language :
'In the case at bar, appellant relied upon a somewhat restricted view of Fifteenth avenue to his
right. A perfectly clear and unobstructed view
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was available to him after his car advanced
only a few feet from where he took the observation upon which he relied. In failing to again
look to his right, he was negligent. He did
not bear the burden which rested upon him as
the disfavored driver, and the trial court properly so held.'''

Dembicer v. Pawtucket Cabinet & Builders Finish
Co., Inc., 193 A. 622, 58 R. I. 451 (R. I. 1937), is an
intersection collision case where an obstruction of clear
vision existed. In affirming a directed verdict for the
defendant, the court said:
''The duty to exercise due care, that is, the care
an ordinary prudent person would exercise under
like circumstances, is therefore one which the
driver of an automobile approaching a street
intersection is particularly hound to observe.
The degree of care required from such driver
at any given time or place varies with the conditions reasonably to be observed at an intersection and increases in proportion to the increased danger reasonably to be apprehended.
The greater the appreciable danger, the greater
the degree of care necessary to constitute due
or ordinary care. It is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to state a rule of general application in intersection cases, unless we establish
one by judicial fiat, which we are not disposed
to do. The determination of what constitutes
due care under the circumstances in any case
must, therefore, depend upon the facts in that
case.
''The driver of an automobile intending to
cross an intersection should not only observe
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the so-called laws of the road, which include
traffic regulations established by statutes or
ordinances; but, before crossing, he should look
when looking is efficient and take into consideration the circumstances attending a~ the
time, such as the physical conditions at the intersection, the weather, road and light conditions,
the relative importance of the streets or highways forming the intersection, the intensity and
course of traffic, and the distance and speed of
other vehicles that may be approaching that
same intersection. The rule in our cases that
one must look before entering and crossing an
intersecting street requires that one look at a
time and place when looking will seasonably
apprise a reasonably careful person of the conditions confronting him at the intersection, so
that he may control his actions accordingly. The
duty is not merely one of looking, but is one
of observing the traffic and general situation
at or in the vicinity of the intersection. He
must look in the careful and efficient manner in
which a man of ordinary prudence in like circumstances would look in order to ascertain
the existing conditions for his guidance.
"We know of no arbitrary rule, established
by statute or by our decisions, as to the time
and place of looking for vehicles on an intersecting street, and no particular distance from the
intersection is prescribed for that purpose. A
person approaching the intersection should make
the necessary observation at a time and place
where observation, in the exercise of ordinary
care, will be reasonably effective. For a further
discussion of this subject, see Andrews v. Penna
Charcoal Co., 55 R.I. 215, 221, 179 A. 696. ''
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To the same effect is Mustin et al v. 'West et al.,
46 So. 2d 136 (La. 1950). Plaintiff proceeded into an
intersection at which there were bushes and other obstructions so as to constitute the same a blind corner,
and had reached and passed the center of the intersection when struck broadside by defendant's automobile
entering the intersection from the plaintiff's right at
an excessive rate of speed. In affirming the judgment
rejecting plaintiffs' demands, the court said:
"Since Mrs. Mustin was approaching a blind
corner and a right-of-way street, it was her
duty to proceed slowly and cautiously until her
automobile had reached a point where there was
no interference with her vision, and then she
should have advanced into North Seventh Street
only when the maneuver could be accomplished
in safety."
... * *
''Circumstances similar to the case before
us were involved in the accident under consideration by the Orleans Court of Appeal in the case
of Huerstel, et al. v. L. Mangano & Co., et al.,
39 So.2d 460, 462. We quote that Court's conclusion: '* * * our scrutiny of the record leads
to the belief that the accident was caused through
the joint negligence of Mrs. Huerstel, who failed
to look and listen, and the driver of the truck,
who operated his vehicle at an excessive }}ate
of speed. Neither owner of the vehicles involved
should be allowed to recover damages.' ''
See also Epps v. Standard Supply & Hardware Co.
et al., 4 So. 2d 790 (Ct. of App. La. 1942); Carey v.
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DeRose, 282 NW 165 (:Mich. 1938); Smith v. Lamb,
263 NW 311 (Iowa 1935).
The third conclusion mentioned above is pointed
out in the cases heretofore cited. Obviously plaintiff
failed to see defendants' car at any time before plaintiff was in the middle of the highway and defendant,
Wood, was some 40 or 50 feet away. Plaintiff tells us
in his own words how the accident could have been
avoided:
'' Q. In sequence looking first to the east
then west and back to the east, at what time in
there did you start the vehicle o?

''A. Well, I started forward; when I
stopped I looked east and there wasn't anyone
coming; I couldn't see very far west; I put
the jeep in gear, drove the jeep ahead so I
could see trucks to the west, trucks hauling
ore from the west, they came quite fast traveling along the road; I could see up the road, there
was no trucks coming, and I looked east then
I saw the car.
"Q. By that time you were completely
into the intersection 1
''A. Yes.
''Q.

Completely over, upon the highway.

''A.

On the highway.

'' Q.

You had your jeep struck in the

middle1
''A. In the middle, yes, a trifle forward
from the center.
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'' Q. I understand your testimony, if you
had waited a very short period of time no accident would have occurred.
"A. No. If I hadn't stopped it wouldn't
have occurred.
~
two~

''Q.

Qne of the

"A.

Yes." (Tr. 57)

This dilemma in which plaintiff found himself was
one of his own manufacture and design. Providing
he saw what was there to be seen, one glance to the
east when he had reached a point where he could
properly observe the highway to the east would have
probably resulted in his waiting "a short period of
time." To say that the accident wouldn't have happened ''if he hadn't stopped,'' can only mean ''if
he hadn't stopped'' too far back to properly observe
the highway when considered with the other alternative he proposes, for surely he is not assuming he
could approach the intersection fully aware of and
recognizing all of the physical dangers he enumerates
and then blindly blunder across in total and complete
disregard of the consequences. And yet, in the final
analysis, this is exactly what he did do and he added
to the disregard and blindness by stopping where he
couldn't see, or failing to see what was there to be seen.
It does not lie in plaintiff's mouth to claim or
assert that if he had observed the automobile of defendants just before he entered the intersection, he
could have proceeded, considering it safe to enter, for
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he testified that he established the speed of the automobile to be 70 miles per hour when he observed it
right on top of him coming straight on and in just a
flash. He also testified:

"Q. Would you have any idea of the speed
of an automobile if you were to observe it moving on the highway 1
"A. Well, possibly would if the automobile was traveling sideways· from me. When
one is coming directly towards you it is hard to
estimate the exact .speed, the only thing you
could tell would be the approximate speed.''
(Tr. 16-17)
Had plaintiff observed defendants' automobile coming
sideways, he would have had an even more accurate
judgment of the speed he assigns to the oncoming
automobile. This court pointed out the negligence
attributable to a plaintiff in such circumstances 1n
Hickok v. Skinner, supra, when they said:
"The fact that the plaintiff had the right of
way over the defendant did not permit him,
after having observed the defendant's car approaching the intersection, to thereafter completely ignore it, even though at the time he
started he might reasonably have believed he
had time in which to get safely across. While
his attention may have been momentarily distracted by other traffic coming south on West
Temple Street, such traffic was required to
stop before entering the intersection and so would
be travelling at a much slower speed than would
the traffic moving along the arterial highway.
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The evidence fails to establish a traffic situation
which required the attention of a reasonably
careful driver to be so restricted as to prevent
him making a second observation to the east.
The scope of plaintiff's vision would have permitted him to have seen the automobile approaching without the necessity of turning his
head completely around to the right. The time
element, even if it were less than is shown by
the evidence, was such that a reasonably prudent
and careful person would have glanced to the
east several times while traversing the distance
from the stop sign to the point of collision.
One look to the east before crossing the center
line of 21st South Street would have disclosed
to the plaintiff that he was about to enter the
path of a rapidly moving vehicle, and that if
he continued forward, a collision of the two
vehicles would most likely occur. Furthermore,
at the relatively slow speed plaintiff was travelling, he could easily have made an immediate
stop in time to have avoided the collision which
did take place.''
CONCLUSION
The evidence shows that defendant, Wood, was
unacquainted with the intersection where the collision
occurred; (Tr. 160) that he was on a straight, oiled
surface highway and nothing existed to warn him of
the intersection. The tall weeds by the .side of the
highway and the embankment and weeds along the
Sugarville-Hinckley road precluded any view of the
approaching jeep. The green jeep blended well with
the weeds and defendant, Wood, could not have seen
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43

the jeep until he did under the circumstances. A reasonably prudent person glances at the speedometer of
his automobile occasionally, and no negligence can
attach to \V ood for his doing so. The only competent
evidence in the record established the speed of defendants' automobile as not being excessive. The defendants' motion for a non-suit should have been granted.
The plaintiff was well acquainted with the intersection. He knew of the presence of weeds and of an
embankment obstructing his vision to the east and
northeast as he approached the intersection. He knew
there was traffic on the Topaz highway. He was so
well aware of the dangers incident to the high weeds
at the intersection obstructing his view and that he
was the disfavored driver as against any vehicle approaching from his right, that he stopped. But he
stopped too far back to properly observe the traffic
on the Topaz highway. He admits he stopped too far
back as far as east bound traffic was concerned, and
the facts are uncontradicted that he was behind a
growth of weeds which must have prohibited him from
observing the defendants' approach from the east.
Further, by his own testimony, and at the speed he
assigns to defendants' automobile, the automobile of
the defendants must have been within the distance he
maintains he could observe to the east. He then failed
to look again to the east until he had reached the
center of the intersection, when at the slow rate of
speed he was traveling he could have stopped the
jeep instantly according to his own words, (Tr. 58)
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and one prior instant glance would have provided him
with that opportunity and would have avoided the
accident. He was guilty of negligence as a matter of
law when he stopped where he stopped before entering
the intersection. And when he looked to the east but
failed to see what was there to be seen. And he was
guilty of negligence when he failed to look to the east
again until he was in the middle of the intersection.
The plaintiff's answers to defendants' written interrogatories, coupled with the opening address of his
counsel to the jury, established the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, and defendants' first motion
for a directed verdict should have been granted. The
testimony of plaintiff and of plaintiff's witnesses further established this contributory negligence, and defendants' motion for a non-suit at the close of plaintiff's evidence should have been granted. The evidence
adduced in the entire trial conclusively proved the
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law, and defendants' second motion for a directed
ver-dict or thereafter, defendants' motion for a new
trial or defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
GRANT C. AADNESEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.
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